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THE RELATIONS OP THE UNITED 
STATES AND MEXICO SINCE 1910 



"Witli the Compliments of the Author 
HERBERT INGRAM PRIESTLEY 



[Reprint from the University op CALirOENiA Chronicle, Vol. XXII, No. 1] 



TlZ34- 



Gift 

Digitized by the'^fefnet Archive 
in 2010 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/relationsofuniteOOprie 




THE EELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND 
MEXICO SINCE 1910 



Herbert Ingram Priestley 



Mexican history of the last decade falls, with regard 
to the exercise of sovereignty, into four major divisions. 
On December 1, 1910, Porfirio Diaz was inaugurated presi- 
dent for the eighth successive time, after a period of long 
discussion and trial of various plans to provide a successor. 
The possibilities of Jose Yves Limantour, Ramon Corral, 
and General Bernardo Reyes were considered and rejected 
as unsatisfactory either to Diaz or to his constituency. 
Diaz had failed, like many another autocrat, to raise up a 
successor; while his own powers grew less from weight of 
years and from the cumulative effects of his bestowal of 
special privileges upon his coterie of governing assistants, 
he lived to see the long impending deluge come upon his 
native land. 

Diaz made fruitless efforts, first to ignore, next to pre- 
vent, the campaign waged against him by Francisco I. 
Madero, but was finally obliged, by the latter 's success in 
arms, to resign his presidency on May 25, 1911, and leave 
Mexico. The second period, that of the Madero ascendancy, 
continued nominally at least for nearly two years from 
the resignation of Diaz, through the four-month provis- 
ional presidency of Francisco de la Barra to the Ten Tragic 
Days, February 9 to 18, 1913. The third period was that 



of tlu' tenure of |)()\ver by X'ictoi-iano Iliierta, until .July jf), 
li)14. Sinee that time, and it is for a longer period than 
any ])i'esident except Diaz, the executive jjower luis been 
controlled by Venustiano Carranza. 

In a general way, American relations with ]Mexico have 
followed much the same chronological divisions. The whole 
period lias as its absorbing feature our sincere, though 
often dubiously managed, effort to assist Mexico to obtain 
a stable, honorable, and effective government, first to the 
end that American lives and property may be secure south 
of the Rio Grande, and second, that our neighbor may for 
her own sake become peaceable and prosperous, so that 
Ave may mutually enjoy the reasonable intercourse which 
should be the portion of civilized nations. 

During the entire period, then, there has been but the 
one question of policy on the part of the American people 
and government. Numerous incidents have, however, 
served to punctuate that policy in ways which have pre- 
vented the desired success. The most significant episode 
of the period, so far as diplomatic tradition goes, entrain-' 
ing as it does events of deepest import in our relations with 
Mexico, was the refusal to accord recognition to General 
Huerta and the persistent and successful effort to procure 
his downfall. Upon the grounds of morality this refusal 
was eminently justifiable. Huerta 's coup Avas effected by 
a small part of the armed forces, which did not represent 
the majority opinion in the Republic; his betrayal of 
Madero Avas treacherous in the extreme; his hands Avere 
stained Avith the blood of useless victims of street fighting ; 
he was certain to benefit by, if he Avas not cognizant of, 
the proposed murder of Madero and Pino Suarez; there 
Avas little ground upon AAdiieh to commend the professed 
patriotism of his folloAvers, or to suggest that President 
Wilson Avas not Avithin the bounds of propriety in prevent- 
ing the success of his ' ' Revolution. 

But the consequences of the announced policy of non- 
recognition of the right of revolution, of rejecting the 



obvious success of an armed movement powerful enough 
to take and hold the capital, are far-reaching. Since that 
step, our relations have been largely bound up with that 
policy. Important, first, however, it is to examine the 
general bases of belief and opinion, or of hope and desire, 
for our Mexican relations which have been cherished by 
the American people for many years, as expressed in ideal- 
istic phrases by President Wilson in his numerous public 
utterances to Mexico and other Hispanic American re- 
publics. 

We may indulge in a backward glance for the sake of 
this examination. While President Diaz was approaching 
his last days of power, a large part of the American peo- 
ple, many of them investors whom Diaz had attracted, 
others simple humanitarians, felt a keen solicitude con- 
cerning the prospects of internal peace when Don Porfirio's 
power should be gone. With this uncertainty prevailing, 
the tragic error of the Creelman interview was committed 
by Diaz. He then gave out a statement which he assuredly 
knew to be erroneous, but which he must have considered a 
justifiable item for American publicity. This was that Mex- 
ico was then ready for democratic government. He also 
declared that he would permit the candidacy in the com- 
ing presidential elections of nominees not directly spon- 
sored by his government. Numerous Mexicans, as well as 
Americans, were so unfortunate as to take this declara- 
tion for a signal that political parties and campaigns might 
freely exist in Mexico. Not long afterward the campaign 
of Madero, ripening into real revolt, was considered in the 
United States as the expression of a long pent-up agony of 
political degradation of the upper classes and the economic 
and social degradation of the lower classes throughout the 
Diaz regime. To an extent this estimate was true, but 
hardly true enough to warrant the popular support among 
us of the Kevolution, or the enthusiasm Math which we 
greeted its success. American opinion, which reached its 
least restrained expression in Roosevelt 's dictum that Diaz 



was tlic greatest man of liis age, fell rapidly away to Ma- 
dero, under the belief that a wiser, more constructive 
statesman, and not a despot, was about to inaugui'ate a' 
period of respect for human rights reared upon the as- 
sured material foundations of prosperity which Diaz had 
planted. So strong was our api)robation that there are not 
lacking those in Mexico who will aver that the Madero Revo- 
lution was supported secretly by the American government. 
No doubt exists among ourselves as to our government's 
neutrality, but the Mexicans -svere convinced that our in- 
terest was intrusive, and that it was affected by the Diaz 
policy of playing off British against American oil interests 
to prevent our influence from becoming preponderant, or 
by the nationalization of the railroads as a check upon our 
strength in Mexico. 

Madero 's influence w-as short-lived because of his weak 
attempt to concilate old political enemies, his refusal to 
reward the aid of the Gomez faction, his brother's rifling 
of the treasury to reimburse family investments in the 
campaign, and his inability to fulfill the millennial prom- 
ises he had made. Americans were disappointed to see that, 
in spite of revolutionary enthusiasm, disorders continued, 
the cabinet began to break up, the State of Oaxaca refused 
to recognize the government ; Orozco, military governor of 
Chihuahua, turned against it, and there was frequent loss 
of American life in the turmoil. Madero, informed by 
President Taft that Americans engaged in belligerent acts 
must not be executed w^hen taken, replied refusing to admit 
our right to proffer the admonition. Conditions during the 
summer of 1912 were extremely bad. American refugees, 
warned to leave Mexico, were brought out in great num- 
bers, Congress appropriating $100,000 for their aid. Suc- 
cesses of rebels in northern Mexico deprived Madero of 
Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa. 

In October, Felix Diaz revolted in Vera Cruz, but was 
promptly captured and imprisoned. Released by sympa- 
thizers, he and Bernardo Reyes began the street fighting 



from the Ciudadela in Mexico City known as the Ten 
Tragic Days, in which Reyes was killed. Huerta went over 
to the reactionaries. Madero and Vice-president Pino 
Suarez were imprisoned and forced to resign, Huerta be- 
coming legal holder of the executive power. Madero and 
Suarez were killed under the "ley fug a" after having been 
promised that their resignations would not be acted upon 
until they had gone aboard a vessel at Vera Cruz. 

Now it was that the erroneous idea of Mexico created 
by the Creelman interview and the Madero Revolution had 
its unhappy effect. President Wilson, believing that a 
real election could be held, refused to recognize Huerta 
and soon began to urge an election. Thus was marked a 
new phase in our relations with Mexico. It began a period 
of direct intervention. Our ambassador, Henry Lane 
Wilson, who had congratulated Huerta upon his accession 
to the presidency, was recalled and subsequently dismissed. 
Our government was imitated in denying recognition by 
the powers of Argentine, Brazil, and Chile. European pow- 
ers which had at first recognized Huerta soon acceded to 
President Wilson's view, but later extended recognition, as 
did several American powers. Our own attitude was the 
decisive factor in the end. 

Huerta, so-called "man of iron," was not in complete 
control of the country. The Revolutionists were led against 
him by Venustiano Carranza, old senator under Diaz and 
supporter of Madero. Huerta was unable to pacifiy the 
country or protect foreigners. President Wilson sent John 
Lind to Mexico as his personal representative to voice a 
request that Huerta should call an early election during an 
armistice ; all factions were to participate and acquiesce in 
the election, Huerta not standing for choice. Huerta be- 
lieved that Lind did not represent American opinion, and 
declined his request. Lind was unsuccessful because Wil- 
son withheld recognition and because the American re- 
quest was physically impossible; the situation was not 
helped by the attempt to argue against the legality of 



8 



Huerta's assumption of office, foi*, as nearly always, llie 
Mexicans had been parlicularly careful to forefend just 
such criticism. 

Harassed by the ui'ging of foreign ministers to yield, 
opposed by Congress, unable to make loans, or to make 
peace with the rebels, unwilling to salute the United States 
flag in reparation for insult to it at Tampico, and without 
power to cope witli our seizure of Vera Cruz on April 21, 
1914, Huerta severed diplomatic relations and the represi-n- 
tatives of the two nations received their passports on April 
22 and 23. 

The tensity of the situation was soon relieved by the 
proffer of their good offices for mediation by Argentine, 
Brazil, and Chile. The United States and Huerta ac- 
cepted, Carranza also doing so "in principle," but declin- 
ing to take part in the negotiations. His emissaries joined 
the Niagara Falls Conference in June, however. There 
the effort was to choose a provisional president acceptable 
to all parties. This plan failed, but it was demonstrated 
that Huerta had no prospect of recognition. After attempt- 
ing to hold an election he resigned on July 15 in favor 
of Carbajal, who was to resign in favor of a Constitution- 
alist, this party now being in control of much of the Re- 
public. He ruled less than a month, resigning and leav- 
ing the city, it is said, upon receipt of a telegram from the 
American government requesting him to hand the govern- 
ment to the Constitutionalists. On August 21 Carranza 
entered Mexico City. The policy of "watchful waiting" 
announced by Wilson on December 2, 1913, now punctu- 
ated by aid to the Carranzistas in arms and munitions, by 
preventing the Huertistas from obtaining the same aid, and 
by hindering their attack upon Tampico, had brought to 
the capital the man deemed by many persons the most 
hopeful prospect for the pacification of the country. 

But the ranks of the victors had already split. Carranza 
became a candidate for the presidency ; Villa declared war 
on him and drove him out of the capital on November 20. 



Carranza moved on Vera Cruz, entering as the Americans, 
delayed in their evacuation, moved out on November 23. 
Villa held Mexico City unopposed from December 1 for 
nearly two months, but was in turn obliged to evacuate, 
being followed by the Zapatistas from Morelos in March, 
1915. This group held the city until July 10. 

During the spring and summer the status of foreigners 
was most unhappy. Spaniards suffered especially, many 
of them, including their minister, being expelled. In 
March President Wilson secured permission from the va- 
rious Mexican leaders to remove foreigners from the cap- 
ital under our protection. His notes of remonstrance to 
Carranza at treatment of foreigners were met by accept- 
ance, though ungracious, of responsibility for their safety. 

During 1914 Villa had been much in the limelight. He 
set up a ^'government" in northern Mexico, and seemed 
for a time to be the man who could restore peace. Emis- 
saries were sent to him by Wilson, but his star never rose 
higher. In April, 1915, Obregon defeated him at Celaya, 
and later near Leon. President Wilson then indicated a 
more vigorous policy by urging the leaders to drop their 
quarrels or the United States "must use means to help 
Mexico save herself and help her people." In August 
the ABC powers, and Bolivia, Guatemala, and Uruguay, 
urged the Mexicans to erect a provisional government and 
call a general election. Carranza protested against this 
"new policy of interference." Our State Department is- 
sued an appeal from the six powers named above and our- 
selves calling for a conference and offering help. Carranza 
again rejected interference, being then successful against 
Villa, who by the same token accepted. In September a 
conference of the powers just mentioned agreed to recognize 
the faction which after three weeks should show greatest 
success in maintaining order. This led to the recognition 
of Carranza as de facto president on October 19 by nine 
American powers. This was a victory which the Constitu- 
cionalistas had not won by decisive military success; the 



10 



step was a precedent-breaking one for us, and justiHal^le, if 
at all, because of the desperate need of peace and the hope 
that it would prove efficacious. 

Recognition elicited from Carran/.a i-cnewed acceptance 
of responsibility for foreign lives and property. Formal 
diplomatic relations Avere resumed in Deccmljer by the ap- 
pointment of Henry P. Fletcher as and)a.ssador and the 
reception of Eliseo Arredondo as representative of the 
new Mexican Government. Fletcher did not go to ^lexico 
until some time later] his residence there has been short 
and intermittent, perhaps as a remonstrance against atti- 
tudes of the Mexican government. 

But the piciued Villistas Avere still to be reckoned with. 
On January 10, 1916, eighteen Americans were shot down 
by them at Santa Ysabel while going into Mexico to re- 
open mines at the solicitation of the Carranza government. 
The United States Congi-ess passed resolutions in both 
houses demanding armed intervention. Carranza prom- 
ised to punish the perpetrators of the atrocity; later two 
Villa leaders, one said to be responsible, were executed. 

In March Villa raided Columbus, killing several Ameri- 
cans. Our troops pursued him on a "hot trail," the pur- 
suit soon becoming a punitive expedition under General 
Pershing. It lacked elements of preparation and execu- 
tion which made it a failure. It aroused fierce resentment 
in Mexico, being condemned by both Americans and Mexi- 
cans for diametrically opposite reasons. Carranza had 
given reluctant and qualified consent to the expedition, but 
soon began to object to it, asking how far our troops in- 
tended to penetrate and how long they would remain. We 
were using 12,000 men in Mexico and 18,000 on the border, 
the latt^^r group soon being largely increased. General 
Obregon, minister of war, conferred with Generals Scott 
and Funston at El Paso, urging our withdrawal. Carranza 
troops failed to aid in the attempt to take Villa. Our State 
Department on ]\Iay 10 called upon Americans in ^lexico 
to leave the country. On the twenty-second Carranza pro- 



11 



tested sharply against the "invasion and violation of sov- 
ereignty." The attempt to take Villa was now ostensibly 
given up, as he had been wounded and reported dead; our 
forces remained only as security against disorders, and 
Carranza was so informed. On June 21 a troop of our 
soldiers, moving, against the expressed desire of Mexico, 
"in a direction other than northward," was attacked at 
Carrizal. A number were killed and about a score were 
made prisoners ; the latter were released upon the sharp 
demand of our government. In July the American forces 
were moving northward, and Carranza expressed readiness 
to discuss measures to remedy the situation, suggesting ac- 
ceptance of Hispanic American offers of mediation. Upon 
Secretary Lansing's acceptance a commission met in Sep- 
tember and sat until January 15, 1917, but failed to dis- 
cover any satisfactory principle of action because Carranza 
would not concede our right to send troops in pursuit of 
raiders. Since that time our troops have frequently crossed 
the line on hot trails, the Mexican government protesting 
in pro forma fashion but offering no active resistance. On 
February 5 the withdrawal of the expedition was com- 
pleted. It had been in Mexico nearly eleven months, had 
engaged over 100,000 militia on the border in addition to 
the invading troops, and had cost about $130,000,000. The 
effect was to add to the anger of the Mexicans and insure 
Villa a place among the immortals of banditry. I recently 
heard him called in northern Mexico "more of a patriot 
than Carranza." Americans in Mexico were placed in 
serious jeopardy ; our niceties about using the northern 
railroads to move our troops made our success highly 
dubious, whereas vigorous use of them would probably have 
brought success. Thus there was a net result of general 
dissatisfaction. It was the most extreme feature of our 
intervention policy thus far ; it attests the amount of strain 
our relations may bear without declaration of war. 

Border troubles have continued since that time without 
variation calculated to change the problem, though once 



12 



GUI' troops actively intervened to support tlie government. 
Frequent waves of irritation occur and may be expected. 
The border patrols are large and costly ; our own action 
has been limited in all cases to our interpretation of the 
right of self-defense. 

Since 1917 the chief difficulty has been due to provisions 
of the new Mexican Constitution concerning petroleum. 
During the great war the problem of Mexico's neutrality 
was more a matter of attitude than of interchange of cor- 
respondence ; there was for a time an undoubted sympathy 
with Germany in hope of relief from the shadow of the 
United States in Mexican affairs, but this feeling grows 
less with time since the failure of the German cause. 

The Constitutionalist party fought its battles to vindicate 
the Constitution of 1857, itself a very liberal document. But 
the Constitutional Convention which met in Queretaro in 
December, 1916, the members of which were chosen by the 
Carranza faction only, enacted an entirely new Constitu- 
tion save in such sections, retained or amplified, as suited 
its program. A radical element inserted, it is said, through 
influence of Socialistic advisers from American territory, 
certain features with which the President is not in full sym- 
pathy. The Constitution is of interest from the viewpoint of 
international relations for two reasons. One involves the 
legality of its enactment, and the other the validity of its 
provisions regarding contractual rights in property. The 
old constitution provided a modus operandi for its amend- 
ment by Congress, and specified that if it should be violated 
or set aside by revolution the responsible persons were to be 
tried under charges of treason. Hence the flaw in the legal 
filiation of the new document can be covered only by the 
definitive success of its sponsors. This point is complicated 
with the second, for the scattered but numerous opponents 
of the present government announce the Constitution of 
1857 "with suitable [but as yet undefined] amendments" as 
the aegis under which they hope to overthrow Carranza ; 
furthermore, the underlying cause of irritation between the 



13 



two countries is the advanced position taken in Article 27 of 
the new Constitution on the ownership of subsoil products. 
This article and the decrees intended to enforce it reinvest 
the nation with ownership of many of these products, in- 
cluding petroleum, as they were held in colonial times, as 
the prescriptive possession of the nation. These decrees are 
considered by those having oil interests, European and 
American, to be confiscatory. Especially menacing are the 
retroactive and coercive provisions of the legislation. They 
have not, however, been put into effect on account of the 
attitude of the oil producers, backed by their respective 
governments. The United States has informed the Mexi- 
can government that it will not brook action confiscatory 
of the property rights of its citizens. With the future pro- 
gram as it affects unbought oil deposits, there is not visible 
ground for international complication. 

The Mexican attitude as to the legal status of subsoil 
products is that the legislation of the Diaz regime, which 
made it possible for purchasers of the land surface to ac- 
quire title to the subsoil products was ''unconstitutional," 
that is, it reversed the basic law of subsoil property. It 
was expected that the Mexican Congress at its sessions last 
summer would enact legislation to remedy the retroactive 
features of the proposed system, which runs counter to the 
contractual rights under which foreigners hold their oil 
lands. It failed to do so; on the contrary, legislation con- 
firming the oil program has been proposed but not passed. 
The president's power has recently been limited by Con- 
gress, which withdrew the plenary war powers he had 
hitherto exercised. This is part of the political contest for 
the presidency which is to culminate in next summer's elec- 
tion. Congress is more radical and less inclined to reasoned 
action on foreign interests than is the President. 

The oil interests feel distrust of Congressional legislation 
to readjust their claims, believing that it can be too easily 
reversed by succeeding sessions. Some pronounced con- 
stitutional change will be required to satisfy the situation, 



14 



though it may be doubted whether even this guarantee 
would be colisidered other than temporary. Laud and min- 
ing h'gisUitiou in ^Mexico has always been peculiarly sus- 
ceptible to the shiftings of the political wind. Recent de- 
crees of President Carranza have made it possible to con- 
tinue oil development without i)rojudice to the basic claims 
of either the Mexican government or the oil pi-odueers. 

Within recent months the question has been raised before 
committees of our own Congress as to whether or not, in 
view of the oil situation, continuing disorder and frequent 
loss of American lives without prompt punishment of mur- 
derers, it would be advisable to withdraw recognition from 
President Carranza. Ambassador Fletcher has pointed out 
the disastrous effect of such a course of action. We are, 
then, in the difficult position of countenancing a govern- 
ment for the existence of which we are largely responsible 
but which has not yet accomplished as much as it ought 
in pacifying and stabilizing the country, or else of accepting 
the more disagreeable and costly alternative of interfering 
with the hope of bringing about more satisfactory condi- 
tions. 

We have hovered near the verge of the latter choice 
many times during the past nine years. IMany Americans 
have vehemently advocated it ; many more consider it in- 
evitable. General public opinion is reluctant to assume so 
grave a responsibility. The most recent estimates of the 
time and force needed to effect establishment of order in 
Mexico through American intervention speak of an army of 
450,000 men operating three years. Such an estimate does 
much to exculpate the ]\Iexican government for having 
failed to bring quiet in nine years with about one-eighth 
as many men and infinitely poorer equipment than ours. 

But it would be only after complete pacification that the 
real task of helping Mexico could begin. Pacification and 
stabilization are the prerequisites to the program, bu.t not 
the program. Some of the labors of Hercules that would 
follow in the train of armed intervention would lead us to 



15 



revision and reorganization of the entire system of land 
ownership ; we should have a struggle to see that this was 
done without more benefit to Americans than to Mexicans. 
We should need to apply heroic curative measures to the 
judicial system ; we should find it difficult to modify a 
Roman system to fit our ideals of procedure in securing 
equal justice for all men. We should have to develop an 
effective industrial and agricultural program for a sub- 
merged and desolated native Indian population ; it would 
require enormous expenditure of labor, and will, and years, 
to make this program effective. We should need to demo- 
cratize education, and educate democracy at the same time ; 
this, after unseating an incipient democracy, imperfect and 
unsatisfactory though it be, would be to place ourselves in 
an equivocal position unless we previously should announce 
a specific date for withdrawal of our intervention. We 
should assume such dubious and Herculean tasks in the 
face of the hatred and suspicion of most of the Hispanic 
American countries unless we should be wise and consistent 
enough to work out a plan of cooperation with South Ameri- 
can powers; any conceivable plan would be most difficult, 
if not impracticable, and in any event the heritage of hatred 
would be very enduring. And we should be under moral 
obligations not to compensate ourselves for our expenditure 
of life and energy by taking territory, unless we chose to 
act counter to our oft repeated public declarations. 

The weight of these considerations may well give us 
pause in coming to a decision as to our proper course. 
There have been many provocations, but there are many 
historic obligations on either side which ought to outweigh 
momentary irritations. Situations due to political campaigns 
may produce important changes at any moment ; they have, 
more than once, presaged the possible overthrow of the 
actual Mexican government and the opening of another sea- 
son of civil war. In such a situation the problem of pro- 
tecting our citizens in Mexico is likely to become extremely 
difficult and urgent. No other consideration could war- 



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rant precipitate action. C^nestions ot" law ami property 
(my:lit to be anu'iiable to treatment by diploniaey, by inter- 
national eomniittees, or by arbitration if these fail. We 
shonld beware of invokini? a too hasty national pride. The 
demand is for the demonstration of the same American 
loyalty to an ideal that sent our two millions over seas. 
The problem is not less perplexing tiian the recent Euro- 
pean situation, even if less dangerous; it is, on the con- 
trary, calculated to tax our capacity for constructive states- 
manship to the utmost. An occasion of real or apparent 
denial of justice to our citizens or our investors in Mexico 
mu.st not anger us into taking action wherein there is pos- 
sibility that technical legality reinforces the position of the 
other side. We must not lay ourselves liable to reproach for 
assuming a new and heavy burden, the solution of which 
may be the means of euriching ourselves. It is a high and 
worthy ideal to look forward to a pacified, happy, and 
prosperous nation with whom, though it be largely of abo- 
riginal stock, we may hope to enjoy on our soutliern border 
the same mutually satisfactory relations as those which have 
prevailed for so many years on the northern one. Tradi- 
tion, ethnological problems, necessity of self-defense, may 
make this ideal impossible of realization. The ever pres- 
ent danger is that -an untoward situation, such as that which 
recently engaged the attention of the public pr(^ss of both 
countries, may impel us to a course of action in which we 
shall defeat ourselves. Like the poor, the problem of Mexico 
we have ever with us. 




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